We develop a model of political accountability with sequential policy making. Consistent with empirical observations, equilibrium behavior by the policymaker overemphasizes the late stages of the policy-making process. The reason is that the overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem-she is tempted to revise her retention rule in the middle of the policy-making process. If the overseer knows the technology by which policies translate into outcomes, then she can eliminate these distortions using taskspecific budget caps. However, if the overseer is uncertain about this technology, such budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency. If the uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential, the overseer prefers an institutional environment in which policymaker actions are non-transparent and the budget is fungible. Such an environment allows the overseer to exploit the policymaker's expertise about the technology, but at the cost of weaker overall incentives. Hence, the model highlights a novel mechanism by which transparency may not always be optimal in political environments. * This paper replaces and subsumes our earlier paper, "Does Clarifying Responsibility Always Improve Policy?" We have received helpful comments from
How does the sequential nature of the policy-making process impact the efficacy of political accountability and optimal political institutions? Political economy models typically assume policymakers have only a single opportunity to set policy prior to moments of accountability. 1 However, in most important policy domains, a policymaker take multiple, sequential actions between decisions by the overseer regarding whether to reward or punish the policymaker. Moreover, empirical scholarship suggests the presence of important inter-temporal distortions in the behavior of policymakers. Most prominent among these is the well known pattern of behavior whereby overseers primarily focus their attention on the later stages of the policy-making process and policymakers, consequently, allocate disproportionately more effort or resources to these later stages relative to the earlier stages (Popkin et al., 1976; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981; Figlio, 2000; Rothenberg and Sanders, 2000; Albouy, 2011) . Such dynamic effects cannot be captured in the context of a single-action model, and perhaps not surprisingly, they have resisted political economy explanations relying on rational agency. 2 We develop a model of political agency with sequential actions. Our model yields two key kinds of results that underscore the importance of explicitly modeling sequential policy making. First, our model gives rise to equilibrium behavior by policymakers that overemphasizes the late stages of the policy-making process. The intuition behind this result is a kind of political time inconsistency problem. The overseer, at the beginning of the game, would like to commit to a retention rule that induces an optimal division of resources across tasks. However, following the early stages of the policy-making process, the overseer is tempted to revise her retention rule in order to optimize incentives going forward. The policymaker anticipates this incentive to revise and consequently underemphasizes the early stages of the policy-making process.
Second, we provide a novel argument for the potential benefits of eliminating transparency in political settings. This argument starts with the observation that, if the overseer knows the technology by which policy translates into outcomes, then she can solve the time inconsistency problem (and the distortions it induces) by establishing perfectly tailored 1 Of course, multitask problems (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) have been analyzed in many settings, including political agency settings (Lohmann, 1998; Besley and Coate, 2003; Ashworth, 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Gehlbach, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2007; Hatfield and Padró i Miquel, 2007; Daley and Snowberg, 2011; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014; Le Bihan, 2014) . None of these models consider the issue of sequential actions prior to a retention decision, which is our focus.
2 The only other papers we are aware of that yield such behavior in equilibrium are Sarafidis (2007) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2010) . In these models, the overemphasis of late stages of the policy-making process emerges due to the assumption that the overseers have a "recency bias", whereas in our model it is a result of purely strategic factors with fully rational overseers.
task-specific budget caps. However, if the overseer is uncertain about this technology, such task-specific budget caps introduce ex post inefficiency by constraining the policymaker's allocation of resources to those tasks that turn out to have the highest marginal returns. In effect, in the presence of uncertainty, task-specific budget caps achieve ex ante efficiency at the cost of sacrificing the overseer's ability to use the ex post expertise of the policymaker, who is better informed about the technology. We show that when uncertainty is large and consequential, the optimal institution for the overseer can be one that is strictly inferior without uncertainty-in particular, the optimal institution may have neither transparent actions nor task-specific budgets.
An important literature, building on insights from Prendergast (1993) , shows that transparency may not be optimal for political overseers because it leads to pandering by policymakers seeking to establish a reputation for being a good type (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts, 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Fox, 2007; Fox and Shotts, 2009; Ashworth and Shotts, 2010; Shotts and Wiseman, 2010; Fox and Stephenson, 2011; Fox and van Weelden, 2012) . 3 Like in those models, in our model eliminating transparency allows the overseer to induce the policymaker to use his expertise to choose better policies. However, unlike in models of pandering, our results do not depend in any way on policymakers seeking to build reputations or signal types. Instead, our results derive from the benefits to the overseer of deferring detailed decision making to the policymaker when the overseer is uncertain regarding the technology by which policy translates into outcomes.
Our argument, thus, admits a very different kind of interpretation than previous arguments for the benefits of eliminating transparency. In pandering models, transparency can be bad because it allows strategic manipulation by policymakers. In our model, transparency can be bad because the overseer, lacking information about the policy-making process, can do better by forcing herself not to manage the details of the policymaker's behavior. She does so by tying her hands to condition retention decisions only on outcomes.
The Model
We study a game between an Overseer (she) and a Policymaker (he). Before turning to a formal definition of the game, we describe the basic structure of our model and the political settings it is meant to describe.
In our game, the Policymaker takes two sequential actions, both of which impact the eventual success or failure of a policy. The Overseer has an opportunity to communicate with the Policymaker prior to each action. After the Policymaker has taken both actions and the policy outcome has been realized, the Overseer retains or dismisses the Policymaker.
We focus on the retention decision because an important characteristic of many political agency settings that distinguishes them from economic settings is that overseers do not have access to a large and flexible set of contract terms. Instead, overseers are often constrained to use blunt instruments, such as retaining or replacing policymakers, allocating or not allocating a fixed budget, or reassigning an policymaker to a less desirable job. Modeling the Overseer's decision as being about whether to retain the Policymaker captures this feature of the political environment in a simple way.
The two key features that characterize the institutional environment we model-an Overseer with retention authority and a fixed moment of accountability-of course, typify most elected offices (if we think of the Overseer as the pivotal voter). But they are also descriptive of a large number of senior government bureaucratic appointees, where our model of communication between the Overseer and Policymaker is particularly natural. For instance, in the United States, many heads of executive bureaus (e.g., the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Internal Revenue Service, and Federal Aviation Administration, among many others) and independent agencies (e.g., the National Transportation Safety Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and Federal Communications Commission, among many others) hold their offices for a fixed term subject to reappointment or replacement by the President. (See Lewis and Selin (2012) for a complete description of all federal bureaucratic positions with fixed terms of office.) The same is also true outside the United States. For instance, the members of the European Food Safety Authority and the French Competition Authority (which polices anti-competitive behavior), Prudential Supervisory Authority (which monitors banks and insurance companies), and High Health Authority, among many others, all also serve for fixed, renewable terms.
The Game
The game consists of two successive policy-making stages followed by a retention stage.
At the beginning of policy-making stage t, the Overseer sends a message, m t , which is interpreted as the Overseer's declaration of her retention rule. The Policymaker observes the message m t and chooses a resource allocation, a t , from the budget available for that policy-making stage, a t . The game ends with the retention stage in which the policy outcome is realized and the Overseer either retains or dismisses the Policymaker.
The retention rule that the Overseer uses in the retention stage may differ from the rules announced in the Overseer's messages in the policy-making stages. Indeed, the retention rules declared during the policy-making stages are cheap talk, only the final retention rule determines whether the Policymaker is actually retained. All actions are observable to all players. 4 In our main model, the total resource budget available to the Policymaker is a 1 + a 2 = A. We will also sometimes consider a variant of our model in which there are no taskspecific budget caps, but rather, the entire budget A is fungible-i.e., the only constraint on allocations is a 1 + a 2 ≤Ā.
The outcome, O, of the policy-making process is either success (s) or failure (f ). The probability of success is p(a 1 , a 2 ). We assume that p(·, ·) is increasing, continuously differentiable, strictly concave in each of its arguments, and has weak complementarities (i.e., p 12 ≥ 0). We also assume the following Inada conditions: lim a i →0 p i (a 1 , a 2 ) = ∞ for i = 1, 2 and any a −i . We refer to the function p interchangeably as the policy success technology or the policy success function.
Payoffs
The Overseer cares only about the outcome of the policy-making process. She has a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function with a payoff from policy success of one and a payoff from policy failure of zero.
The Policymaker values two things: retention and rents from resources not allocated to policy making. The Policymaker's preferences are described by the following von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility function:
if not retained.
The term B > 0 represents the Policymaker's benefit from being retained. The function u(·)
represents the Policymaker's payoffs from resources that he controls but does not expend on policy (i.e., rent seeking). We assume that u is increasing, weakly concave, and continuously differentiable. To focus on the interesting case in which the Overseer cannot extract the entire budget from the Policymaker, we maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 1 B < u(A) − u(0).
Strategies
A strategy for the Policymaker is a mapping from histories into a choice of actions. In particular, it is a pair of functions (a 1 (·), a 2 (·, ·, ·)), where Let R be the set of all retention rules-i.e., mappings from Policymaker actions and policy outcomes into a probability of retention. A strategy for the Overseer is a message choice in the first policy-making stage, a history-contingent message choice in the second policy-making stage, and a history-contingent retention rule in the retention stage. The Overseer's strategy, then, is a triple (m 1 , m 2 (·, ·), ρ(·, ·, ·, ·)), where m 1 ∈ R is the firststage message, m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) ∈ R is the second-stage message following a history (m 1 , a 1 ), and ρ(m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R is the retention rule actually used. Hence, following a history
Solution Concept
Our basic solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Since declarations of retention rules during policy-making stages are cheap talk, SPNE does not prevent the Overseer from declaring a retention rule early in the game and making a different declaration or using a different rule later. Moreover, the retention rule actually used in the retention stage is chosen after all actions are taken, so any rule is sequentially rational. As is usual in such environments, there are many equilibria.
We select an equilibrium by considering a perturbed game in which the Overseer bears a cost, > 0, for changing a declared retention rule from one stage to the next. We call an SPNE robust to small revision costs if it is the limit of a sequence of equilibria in a sequence of nearby games with ever smaller costs . Formally:
, is robust to small revision costs if, for all δ > 0, there exists an > 0 such that, for all < , there is an equilibrium, s = (m 1 , m 2 , ρ , a 1 , a 2 ), of the perturbed game, satisfying:
5 With a fungible budget, strategies can be redefined in the obvious way.
|m
4. |a 1 (m 1 ) − a * 1 (m 1 )| < δ for all m 1 ; and
The intuition for our selection criterion is that the Overseer may face small costsreputational, psychological, or in terms of communication-for "changing her mind" (i.e., acting contrary to her messages). As such, we select those equilibria in our pure cheaptalk game that are robust to the presence of small costs for the Overseer if she revises her declared retention rule from one stage to another. 6
This selection criterion is the appropriate counterpart, for our political economy setting, of renegotiation proofness. A contract is not renegotiation proof if the principal and the agent would both be willing to change terms at some interim stage. In the contracting setting, it is natural to think that both parties must agree to a change in terms. However, in our political economy setting, it is natural to think that the Overseer can unilaterally change the retention rule she plans to use. Thus, under our selection criterion, like under renegotiation proofness, the Overseer has some commitment power, but it is not complete.
In particular, since there are positive costs to revising the retention rule and all Policymaker actions are taken prior to the retention stage, the Overseer can commit to a retention rule in the second policy-making stage. However, since the costs of revision are getting infinitesimal, in the first policy-making stage the Overseer can credibly commit to a retention rule only to the extent that there will be no positive benefit to revising it in the second policy-making stage.
We refer to an SPNE that is robust to small revision costs as an equilibrium.
Benchmark with Commitment
Before analyzing equilibrium behavior and the welfare consequences of various institutions, a useful benchmark is the outcome the Overseer achieves if she can commit to a retention rule ex ante. We denote the efficient division of resources across tasks as follows.
be the efficient division of total spending A. That is:
p(a 1 , a 2 ) subject to a 1 + a 2 = A.
6 One can think of these revision costs as a kind of "lying cost" although, here, the costly lie is about future behavior rather than private information, as it is in Kartik (2009). Suppose the Overseer wants to induce the Policymaker to spend a total amount A .
The strongest incentives she can provide the Policymaker are to retain him if and only if he spends A . Hence, the most the Overseer can induce the Policymaker to spend is A max given by:
Notice that the maximal amount the Policymaker can be induced to spend, A max , is increasing in the overall budget, A. To avoid proliferation of notation we suppress this functional dependence in our notation.
The Overseer can induce the Policymaker to spend these resources efficiently by using a rule that retains if and only if the Policymaker chooses allocations (a †
). This implies the following. (All omitted proofs are in the appendix.) Proposition 1.1 If the Overseer can commit to a retention rule ex ante, then the best outcome the Overseer can obtain is to induce the Policymaker to choose (a † 1 (A max ), a † 2 (A max )).
Equilibrium with Budget Caps
We now turn to an analysis of equilibrium in the model with budget caps. The following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be a SPNE that is robust to small revision costs.
Lemma 2.1 An SPNE, s * , is robust to small revision costs if and only if
The logic of Lemma 2.1 is as follows. At the retention stage, all Policymaker actions have been taken. Hence, the Overseer will stick to whatever retention rule she declared in the second policy-making stage (point 1 of the lemma). Given this, the Policymaker will choose an allocation to the second task that is a best response to the retention rule declared by the Overseer at the beginning of the second policy-making stage (point 2 of the lemma). Further, once the second policy-making stage is reached, the actions in the first policy-making stage are already taken. As such, regardless of what happened in the first policy-making stage, in the second policy-making stage the Overseer will announce and then follow a retention rule that, when best responded to, maximizes the second allocation (point 3 of the lemma). Anticipating this fact, in the first policy-making stage the Policymaker will find an announced rule credible only if the Overseer will have no incentive to revise the rule in the second policy-making stage. Hence, the Policymaker will choose an allocation to the first task that is a best response to the rule he anticipates the Overseer will announce in the second policy-making stage, given the history of the first policy-making stage (point 4 of the lemma). Thus, in the first policy-making stage, the Overseer will announce a rule that, when best responded to, maximizes the first allocation, subject to the constraint that it then maximizes the second allocation at all histories (point 5 of the lemma). Given this,
we solve for equilibrium behavior starting at the second policy-making stage.
Second Policy-Making Stage
Suppose the first allocation was a 1 and the Overseer wants to induce the Policymaker to allocate a 2 . The largest incentive the Overseer can give the Policymaker to choose a 2 is to reward that choice with certain retention, while punishing all other choices with certain non-retention. If the Overseer adopts such a rule, the best the Policymaker can do is either to choose a 2 and be retained, or invest nothing at the second allocation decision while foregoing retention. The set of a 2 allocations that the Overseer can induce the Policymaker to choose following some history (m 1 , a 1 ) is characterized by the following result:
Lemma 2.2 There exists m 2 ∈ R such that the Policymaker's best response is to allocate a 2 ≤ a 2 , following a history (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ), if and only if a 2 ≤â 2 (a 1 ) implicitly defined by
An implication of Lemma 2.2 is that the Overseer can induce the Policymaker to expend a 2 in the second policy-making stage, following a history that includes the action a 1 , if and only ifâ 2 (a 1 ) ≥ a 2 . This is true if and only if
Since the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in a 1 , it is easier to extract the entire second-task budget as the first allocation decreases. Letâ 1 be the maximal a 1 such that it is feasible to extract the full second task budget from the Policymaker. It is implicitly defined by
At a history where it is possible to extract the entire second allocation budget (i.e., induce a 2 = a 2 ), the Overseer will declare a rule that does so. At a history where it is not possible to induce the Policymaker to allocate a 2 = a 2 , the Overseer will declare a rule that induces as large a second allocation as possible-i.e.,â 2 (a 1 ) as defined in Lemma 2.2. Thus we have the following:
Lemma 2.3 In any equilibrium, at any history (m 1 , a 1 ):
• If a 1 <â 1 , then the Overseer announces a rule, m 2 (m 1 , a 1 , a 2 ) such that
• If a 1 ≥â 1 , then the Overseer announces a rule, m 2 (m 1 , a 1 , a 2 ) that certainly retains if a 2 =â 2 (a 1 ) and certainly replaces if a 2 <â 2 (a 1 ).
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2.
An important point from the analysis thus far is that for a 1 <â 1 , the Overseer can induce the Policymaker to choose a 2 = a 2 without using the full force of the retention incentives-that is, by offering the Policymaker a probability of retention equal to zero for a 2 = a 2 and a probability of retention strictly less than one for a 2 = a 2 . This fact will make it possible for the Policymaker to extract some effort in the first policy-making stage, as we will see below.
First Policy-Making Stage
Now consider the first policy-making stage. The rule the Overseer credibly announces is partially locked in by incentives to revise in the second policy-making stage. The Policymaker will not believe any announcement in the first policy-making stage that claims not to retain according to the exact retention probabilities described in the second point of Consider retention rules that induce some a 1 <â 1 . Lemma 2.3 says that for any such a 1 , the Overseer must adopt a retention rule that induces a 2 = a 2 . Since, when a 1 <â 1 , the Overseer can do so with a retention rule that rewards a 2 with a probability of retention strictly less than one, the Overseer also has some capacity to give incentives for choosing a positive level of a 1 , by using the residual probability not needed to induce a 2 . The next result uses this fact to put bounds on the Policymaker's expected payoff from any pair (a 1 , a 2 ), with a 1 <â 1 , when the Overseer uses a retention rule that is consistent with optimal behavior in the second policy-making stage.
Lemma 2.5 For any a 1 <â 1 , all of the following are true:
1. For any retention rule that is consistent with Lemma 2.3, the Policymaker's payoff from choosing (a 1 , a 2 ) is bounded below by u(A − a 1 ) and bounded above by B + u(A − a 1 − a 2 ).
2. There exists a retention rule that induces the Policymaker to choose a 2 = a 2 following a 1 while providing the Policymaker with a payoff of u(A − a 1 ).
3. There exists a retention rule that induces the Policymaker to choose a 2 = a 2 following a 1 while providing the Policymaker with a payoff of B + u(A − a 1 − a 2 ).
The Overseer's problem in the first policy-making stage is the following. She wants to choose the retention rule that maximizes a 1 , subject to the constraint that for all a 1 <â 1 , the rule induces a 2 = a 2 . What is the highest a 1 she can induce?
To answer this question, consider the following. Suppose the Overseer wants to send a message m 1 that she will not have an incentive to revise at any history and that will induce the Policymaker to choose a pair (a 1 , a 2 ) for some a 1 <â 1 . The strongest incentive she can credibly give to the Policymaker is to make all other pairs (a 1 , a 2 ) as unattractive as possible (subject to a 2 = a 2 being a best response following each a 1 <â 1 ) while making (a 1 , a 2 ) as attractive as possible.
Lemma 2.5 shows precisely how unattractive the Overseer can make a pair (a 1 , a 2 ) without violating the constraint, from Lemma 2.3, that a 2 = a 2 must be a best response at any history with a 1 <â 1 . In particular, she can choose a rule that induces a 2 = a 2 following a 1 and leaves the Policymaker with a payoff of u(A − a 1 ). Suppose the Overseer does this.
Then, for the Policymaker, the most attractive (a 1 , a 2 ) with a 1 = a 1 will be (0, a 2 ), which yields a payoff of u(A).
Lemma 2.5 also shows that the Overseer can credibly announce a rule that induces a 2 = a 2 following a 1 while giving the Policymaker a payoff from (a 1 , a 2 ) of B +u(A−a 1 −a 2 ).
The lemma shows that this is the highest payoff the Policymaker can make from this choice, since the Policymaker is retained with certainty.
Taken together, these arguments imply that the Overseer can credibly announce a rule that is consistent with Lemma 2.3 and induces the Policymaker to choose (a 1 , a 2 ) if and only if:
From this, we can identify the highest a 1 that the Overseer can induce with a retention rule that is consistent with Lemma 2.3:
Lemma 2.6 The highest a 1 that the Overseer can induce as a best response to a retention rule that is consistent with Lemma 2.3 isã 1 given by:
Proof. Follows from the argument in the text.
Equilibrium Policy
Given the preceding analysis, the following result characterizes the equilibrium policy choices:
Proposition 2.1 In any equilibrium, the Policymaker's actions on the equilibrium path are
withâ 2 andã 1 implicitly defined in equations (2) and (4), respectively.
Proposition 2.1 establishes the first of our key results. In equilibrium, the Overseer faces a political time inconsistency problem. She cannot credibly commit not to revise her retention rule after the first allocation is taken. This distorts the Policymaker's incentives.
In particular, because the Policymaker anticipates this incentive for the Overseer to revise, it is impossible for the Overseer to induce the Policymaker to expend any resources on the first task unless she is able to induce the Policymaker to expend the entire second-task budget. Hence, unless the second task budget is quite small relative to its importance for achieving policy success, in equilibrium, there will be an inefficient underemphasis on the first task relative to the second task by the Policymaker.
Equilibrium with a Fungible Budget
When the Policymaker's budget is fungible, equilibrium behavior is very similar to equilibrium behavior with budget caps. However, with a fungible budget, the Overseer's time inconsistency problem binds even more strongly. (The analysis is very similar to the budgetcap case, so we move somewhat faster through it.)
Lemma 8.1 in the appendix provides necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium analogous to those in Lemma 2.1. The analysis of the second policy-making stage follows exactly the same logic as Lemma 2.2. Following a history (m 1 , a 1 ), the Overseer can induce any a 2 less than or equal toâ 2 (a 1 ). Given this, at a history (m 1 , a 1 ), there is a rule that induces the policymaker to spend the full remaining budget (i.e., choose a 2 = A − a 1 ) if and only if a 1 ≥â 1 , implicitly defined by:
Now we must consider two kinds of histories: those with a 1 ≥â 1 and those with a 1 <â 1
First, consider a history with a 1 <â 1 , so that no rule the Overseer can declare in the second policy-making period will induce the Policymaker to spend the whole remaining budget. At such a history, the most the Overseer can extract at the second policy-making stage isâ 2 (a 1 ). She does so by announcing that she will retain for certain if a 2 =â 2 (a 1 ) and not retain if a 2 <â 2 (a 1 ). 7
Next, consider a history with a 1 ≥â 1 , so that the Overseer can induce the policymaker to spend the whole remaining budget (i.e., choose a 2 = A − a 1 ). Clearly, following such a history, the Overseer will announce a rule that does in fact induce the Policymaker to spend the whole remaining budget.
Given this, what are the Policymaker's incentives in the first policy-making stage. Regardless of the m 1 announced, if the Policymaker chooses a 1 <â 1 , he knows the Overseer will announce a rule in the second policy-making stage that inducesâ 2 (a 1 ) and that retains him for certain for doing so. In this case, the Policymaker's payoff will be:
Hence, if the Policymaker is going to choose a 1 <â 1 , he wants to minimize a 1 +â 2 (a 1 ).
Importantly, whileâ 2 (a 1 ) is decreasing in a 1 , it is decreasing in a less than one-for-one manner. This is because, for any a 1 <â 1 , in the second policy-making stage the Overseer will use a rule that achievesâ 2 (a 1 ) and retains for certain. This implies that the size ofâ 2 is determined by the marginal costs of effort (in terms of foregone rents) to the Policymaker.
For a higher a 1 , the marginal costs of foregone rents are lower, so the Overseer is able to extract more a 2 . Thus, a 1 +â 2 (a 1 ) is increasing in a 1 , which implies that the Policymaker is best off choosing a 1 = 0, as formalized in the next result.
Lemma 3.1 With a fungible budget, for any m 2 consistent with equilibrium, the pair (0,â 2 (0)) is preferred by the policymaker to any other pair (a 1 ,â 2 (a 1 )) with a 1 <â 1 .
Given that it will result in retention in equilibrium, the Policymaker's expected payoff from choosing a 1 = 0 (followed byâ 2 (0)) is:
If, instead, the Policymaker chooses a 1 ≥â 1 , the Overseer will induce the Policymaker to choose a 2 = A−a 1 in the second policy-making stage. Hence, the Policymaker's payoff from choosing a 1 ≥â 1 is bounded above by B + u(0), which is strictly less than B + u(A −â 2 (0)).
This implies that the Overseer cannot induce the Policymaker to spend anything on the 7 She can announce any rule for a2 >â2(a1), since such an allocation is not a best response to any retention rule. Proof. The result follows from Lemma 3.1 and the argument in the text.
Optimal Budgeting and Time Inconsistency
In this section we evaluate the welfare properties of equilibrium under various budgeting institutions and characterize the optimal such institution. We start by showing that total expenditures by the Policymaker are the same in the equilibrium of the model with fixed budget caps, with a fungible budget, and with ex ante commitment by the Overseer. That is,
Proposition 4.1 implies that the only difference in outcomes induced by a change in commitment power or a change of budgeting institution is the allocation of expenditures across tasks induced by the political time inconsistency problem. Given this, our next result, which compares the Overseer's welfare under ex ante commitment to her welfare under various budgeting institutions, underscores the negative welfare consequences of the Overseer's time inconsistency problem. The result also shows how the Overseer can solve the time inconsistency problem by choosing optimal task-specific budget caps for the Policymaker.
Proposition 4.2 1. The Overseer has the same equilibrium payoff under ex ante commitment and under fixed budget caps if those budget caps are exactly
2. The Overseer's welfare is strictly higher under these budget caps than under any other budget caps or under a fungible budget.
These results have have two key implications. First, the conjunction of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 implies that the reduction in the Overseer's welfare in the model with fixed budget caps (or the model with a fungible budget) relative to the case of ex ante commitment (except when budget caps are perfectly tailored) is not due to a change in the total level of expenditures the Overseer is able to induce the Policymaker to take. Rather, it is entirely due to distortions in the allocation of expenditures across tasks by the Policymaker.
Second, Proposition 4.2 implies that the Overseer's welfare is maximized by choosing precisely the right budget caps. Optimally chosen task-specific budgets undo the distortions caused by the Overseer's time inconsistency problem, ensuring an efficient division of total spending between the two tasks and making the Overseer strictly better off than under a different set of budget caps or a fungible budget.
It is important to note that, although optimal budget caps allow the Overseer to achieve the welfare she would achieve under ex ante commitment, an observer would still see the Policymaker seemingly over-emphasizing tasks late in the policy-making process. In particular, under the optimal budget caps, the Policymaker always spends the full second-task budget allocation, but he never spends the full first-task budget allocation. This is because, in order to overcome the Overseer's time inconsistency problem and induce the Policymaker to divide the resources efficiently, the optimal budget allocations put the entire portion of the budget that the Policymaker will consume as rents, A − A max , into the first-task's budget. Given this, it might seem that an Overseer with budgetary control could eliminate rent seeking entirely by allocating the optimal second-task budget and then reducing the first-task budget cap by A − A max . But this won't work because A max is decreasing in the total resources available (A). Hence, reducing the first-task budget (which is a reduction in the total budget) would decrease total expenditures by the Policymaker (i.e, would reduce A max ). In sum, even under the optimal budget caps, which eliminate the distortions associated with time inconsistency, the behavior of the Policymaker still will appear biased toward tasks late in the policy-making process, relative to the size of the budget allocations.
Uncertainty Regarding Policy Success Technology
The results above indicate that the Overseer can solve the time inconsistency problem and achieve the best feasible outcome if she can create an institutional environment that allows her to exert very strict control over the Policymaker. In particular, two aspects of the institutional environment are critical. First, the Overseer must set precisely the right taskspecific budget caps. Second, it is important that the environment is transparent-that is, the Overseer can observe the Policymaker's task-specific allocations and, thus, can exercise fine-grained control by conditioning her retention decisions on those allocations.
The fact that the Overseer can achieve the same outcome as under ex ante commitment in such an institutional environment depends on a key informational assumption: in order to perfectly tailor the task-specific budget caps, the Overseer must know exactly what the policy success technology is. Given how demanding this assumption is, it is important to explore what happens when the Overseer lacks such information. We do so in this section by studying a setting with an incompletely informed Overseer and fully informed Policymaker.
In particular, we assume that the Policymaker knows the relative importance of the two inputs to achieving policy success, but that the Overseer does not. The case of a Policymaker with such expertise is natural in contexts relevant for our model. 8 For instance, consider an intelligence agency tasked with preventing terrorism. Such agencies are often responsible for both intelligence gathering and for acting on such intelligence (e.g., through increases in security, drone strikes, and so on). These agencies tend to have significantly more information than legislative-or executive-branch overseers about the relevant security environment, and thus, about the relative effectiveness of each input for successfully thwarting terrorism. Similarly, consider the rollout of the federal health care exchange in the United States in 2013 as a part of health care reform. This rollout involved several steps, including identifying and approving health plans for inclusion in the exchange, promulgating a variety of regulations, and building and managing both the back-and front-ends of a website (this last task proved to be a major stumbling block). The Department of Health and Human Services had access to significantly more information than the White House about the relative difficulty of these tasks and, thus, the amount of resources and effort each required. It is this kind of informational asymmetry about the importance of the various inputs to policy success that we model below.
As highlighted in the Introduction, our main results will indicate a complete reversal in the Overseer's preferred institutions relative to the setting with complete information.
The basic logic for this reversal is as follows. When the Overseer is uncertain of the policy success technology, the budget caps that optimally solve the time inconsistency problem from the Overseer's ex ante perspective induce an ex post inefficient division of resources across tasks. This will not be the case if she instead eliminates transparency. By eliminating transparency, the Overseer ties her hands to condition her retention decision only on the success or failure of policy. This induces the Policymaker to use his expertise to allocate resources as efficiently as possible between the two tasks. Moreover, once she eliminates transparency, the Overseer also wants to do away with her ability to set task-specific budget caps, instead deferring to the Policymaker by leaving the budget fungible.
Of course, the ex post efficiency that the Overseer obtains by eliminating transparency and budget caps comes at a cost. Eliminating transparency reduces the power of incentives, lowering overall expenditures by the Policymaker. However, as we show below, if the Overseer's uncertainty about the policy success technology is sufficiently large and consequential, she may be willing to accept this diminution in total expenditures in order to gain the benefits of ex post efficiency.
To study these ideas, we will assume that the policy success function is given bŷ p(a 1 , a 2 , ω), where ω ∈ {ω, ω} is the state of the world. The Policymaker observes ω, which is his private information. Let µ 0 be the Overseer's prior that the state is ω. For each ω ∈ {ω, ω},p(·, ·, ω) satisfies all of the conditions on p(·, ·) above.
We are interested in uncertainty over the relative importance of the two tasks, not the potential power of the policy success function. To focus our analysis on such uncertainty, we posit the following symmetry property:
We continue to use the same equilibrium selection criterion-robustness to small revision costs-to select a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
It will be useful to define the efficient division of resources, conditional on the state.
Definition 5.1 Let (a ω 1 (A), a ω 2 (A)) be the efficient division of total spending A conditional on ω. That is:
Since the Inada conditions guarantee an interior solution, differentiability of (a ω 1 (·), a ω 2 (·)) follows straightforwardly from the implicit function theorem.
Assumption 2 implies that the Overseer's uncertainty is about the correct allocation of the budget across two tasks, but not about the potential power of the policy success function. That is, holding the budget fixed, a person with full information could achieve the same expected outcome, regardless of the realization of the state. Formally, for any
We continue to assume that the Overseer can set the budget caps endogenously or leave the budget fungible. We consider two scenarios. The first scenario, which we refer to as a scenario with transparent actions, exactly corresponds to the model described in Section 1, but with the Overseer uncertain about the policy success function. In the second scenario, which we refer to as a scenario with non-transparent actions, the Overseer only observes the outcome (i.e., success or failure) and is thus constrained to use retention rules that are constant in a 1 and a 2 . Denote the set of such retention rules withR.
Transparent Actions and Optimal Budget Caps
When actions are observable, behavior in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is robust to small revision costs in the model with uncertainty over the state is identical to behavior in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that is robust to small revision costs in the model without uncertainty over the state.
To see this, start by considering the end of the game. Clearly, in the retention stage, the Overseer will stick to whatever retention rule she announced in the second policy-making stage. As such, the Policymaker will choose a 2 to best respond to that announced rule.
(This replicates points 1 and 2 of Lemma 2.1.) Now let µ m 1 ,a 1 be the Overseer's posterior belief that the state is ω following the history (m 1 , a 1 ). The expected probability of policy success,
is strictly increasing in a 2 for any µ m 1 ,a 1 . Hence, in any equilibrium that is robust to small revision costs, at any history (m 1 , a 1 ), the Overseer must announce and stick to a retention rule in the second policy-making stage that, when best responded to, yields the 
is strictly increasing in a 1 , the Overseer will announce the rule that, when best responded to, maximizes the first allocation, subject to the constraint that it then maximizes the second allocation at all histories. (This replicates point 5 of the Lemma 2.1.) Given the argument above, it is straightforward that the game with observable actions and uncertainty about the policy success technology is strategically identical to the main model, with behavior by both the Overseer and Policymaker being exactly as described in Proposition 2.1. (A similar analysis holds for the fungible budget case.) Taking this analysis as given, we next note some of its implications for the Overseer's welfare. Proposition 4.2 shows that, when she does not face uncertainty, the Overseer's welfare is maximized by setting perfectly tailored task-specific budget caps that induce the efficient division of A max between the two tasks. Similarly, when the Overseer faces uncertainty over the policy success function, the best the Overseer can do is to choose task-specific budget caps that induce the ex ante efficient division of A max between the two tasks. The Inada conditions on eachp ensure that this optimal division will be interior. Hence, the Overseer's problem reduces to choosing a task-two budget cap, a 2 = A max −ǎ 1 , withǎ 1 given by:
To summarize: Proof. Follows from the argument in the text.
The division induced by the Overseer is ex ante optimal. Importantly, because the ex ante optimal allocation hedges the risk from uncertainty over the policy success function, it is not optimal ex post. As such, as the Overseer becomes less certain about the policy success technology, she gets worse off, since the ex ante optimum is getting worse, on average, from an ex post perspective.
Non-Transparent Actions
Suppose the Overseer observes only the final policy outcome, but not the Policymaker's actions. She must now use a retention rule that is constant in actions-i.e., a retention rule drawn from the setR. Here, behavior in an equilibrium that is robust to small revision costs is even more simple. Since actions are unobserved, the Overseer will never have a reason to revise her announced retention rule. Hence, in equilibrium, the Overseer will announce and stick to the retention rule (from the set of retention rules that do not condition on actions)
that, when best responded to, maximizes her ex ante expected utility. The Policymaker will choose his two actions as best responses to this retention rule.
Before turning to the analysis, one additional piece of notation will be useful. Definê
as the probability of success, given the efficient allocation of total effort A. Recall that,
given Assumption 2, while (a ω 1 (A), a ω 2 (A)) depends on ω,P is constant in ω. Given thatp is differentiable in a 1 and a 2 , and that (a ω 1 (·), a ω 2 (·)) is differentiable in A, it is straightforward thatP is differentiable in A. For any such retention rule, the probability of retention, then, is entirely pinned down by the probability of success. And the efficient division of resources between the two tasks is the cheapest (i.e., rent maximizing) way for the Policymaker to achieve any given probability of success (and, thus, probability of retention). This intuition is formalized in the following result.
Proposition 5.2 Fix a retention rule r ∈R and assume the budget is fungible. For any ω ∈ Ω, if the Policymaker spends resources A > 0, then she divides them efficiently between the first and second allocations, choosing (a ω 1 (A), a ω 2 (A)).
We next turn to characterizing equilibrium behavior. Since the Overseer's rule has no effect on the Policymaker's allocation of resources across tasks, the ex ante optimal rule for the Overseer must maximize incentives for total expenditures by the Policymaker. Not surprisingly, this rule is unique: the Overseer rewards policy success with certain retention and punishes policy failure with certain replacement. Moreover, given the efficiency induced by a fungible budget in the absence of transparency, the Overseer following that rule weakly prefers to leave the budget fungible rather than set task-specific budget caps.
Proposition 5.3 If actions are non-transparent, then in any equilibrium:
1. Regardless of whether there are budget caps or the budget is fungible, the Overseer will announce and stick to a retention rule that retains with certainty following a successful outcome and replaces with certainty following a failed outcome.
2. The Overseer is weakly better off with a fungible budget than with fixed budget caps.
Given these results, absent transparency, the best the Overseer can do is to leave the budget fungible. She then retains the Policymaker if and only if the policy succeeds. As a result, the Policymaker's total expenditures without transparency, denoted A N T , are divided ex post efficiently between the two tasks and are characterized by the following first-order condition 9 : The trade-off between the two institutions points to the possibility that uncertainty over the policy success technology can completely reverse the characteristics of the optimal institution: from one with tight budgetary control and transparency to facilitate retention conditioned on task-specific allocations to one with a fungible budget and non-transparency to facilitate retention based only on outcomes. Indeed, we show that this is the case below.
Comparing the Two Institutions
Whether the Overseer prefers a system with transparent allocations and carefully tailored, task-specific budgets or a system with non-transparent allocations and a fungible budget depends on the relative importance of the power of incentives versus ex post efficiency.
The costs of transparency, in terms of ex post inefficiency, are largest when the Overseer's uncertainty over the policy success technology is large. Indeed, it is straightforward that as uncertainty regarding the policy success technology goes to zero (i.e., µ 0 goes to zero or 1), the Overseer strictly prefers transparency. The question remains as to whether the Overseer prefers non-transparency if uncertainty regarding the policy success technology is large enough (i.e., µ 0 sufficiently close to 1/2). The answer will turn out to be yes, if the uncertainty also is sufficiently consequential.
To show that this is the case, we begin with the following result:
Lemma 5.1 Under transparency, the allocation of resources between the two tasks induced by the Overseer's optimal budget caps is differentiable in µ 0 . Moreover, at µ 0 = 1/2, the
Overseer induces an allocation of
A max 2 to each task.
As uncertainty becomes large, the two tasks become equally important from an ex ante perspective, and the Overseer will choose budget caps that induce an allocation approaching
to each task. As we show next, when the uncertainty is sufficiently consequential around that allocation, the Overseer will prefer doing away with transparency.
Intuitively, uncertainty is consequential if the realization of the state has a big impact on the relative importance of the two inputs to the policy success function. To be a little more formal, let the impact of task 1 at state ω and allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) be given by:
Similarly, the impact of task 2 at state ω and allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) is:
Now we can define ∆ min (a 1 , a 2 , ω) to measure the impact of the less important task at state ω and allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) as:
The state where the less important task matters most at allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) is:
Finally, we can measure the consequence of uncertainty at allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) as:
∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) measures the impact on the probability of success of the less important task at allocation (a 1 , a 2 ) at the state where the less important task matters the most. It is important to see why this is a measure of how consequential uncertainty is. If ∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) is large (i.e., ∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) goes to max{∆ 1 (a 1 , a 2 , ω * (a 1 , a 2 )), ∆ 2 (a 1 , a 2 , ω * (a 1 , a 2 ))}), then the two tasks have similar impacts on outcomes, so uncertainty over which task is more important is relatively inconsequential. If ∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) is small (i.e., close to zero), then only the important task matters, and uncertainty over which task is more important is very consequential. Hence, we will say that uncertainty becomes consequential at (a 1 , a 2 ) as ∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) gets small and becomes maximally consequential at (a 1 , a 2 ) as ∆ * (a 1 , a 2 ) goes to zero. Notice, this notion of consequentialness is only about the relative impact of the two tasks at a given allocation profile, not the absolute impact of either.
The next result shows that as uncertainty becomes both large and maximally consequential, the Overseer prefers non-transparency to transparency if the diminished power of incentives is small enough relative to the gains from efficiency.
Proposition 5.5 Let µ 0 = 1/2. As uncertainty becomes maximally consequential at .
Proposition 5.5 shows that as uncertainty becomes maximally large and consequential, eliminating transparency is preferred if it does not diminish incentives too much (P large relative to u ). We next put some more structure on functional forms to show that this result holds not only at the limit of uncertainty and consequence.
Assumption 3 There is a function f :
Note that if both Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, we have that ω = 1 − ω. Hence, it is without any further loss of generality to focus on ω ≥ 1/2.
Under Assumption 3, as µ 0 goes to 1/2, uncertainty gets large and as ω goes to 1, uncertainty becomes increasingly consequential. The next result parallels Proposition 5.5
in showing that if uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential, the Overseer prefers non-transparency to transparency but, under the Assumption 3, it shows that to be the case for an open set of (µ 0 , ω).
Proposition 5.6 Suppose the model is consistent with Assumption 3. If
then there exists a κ > 0 such that, for any
then the Overseer prefers non-transparency to transparency.
This proposition shows that as uncertainty becomes large and consequential, the Over- Note, first, that A max satisfies
Further, A N T (1) satisfies the following first-order condition:
Rearranging, we have that A N T (1) satisfies
Looking at Equation 8, the limit of the left-hand side as k goes to 1 is 1 − A N T . The limit of the right-hand side as k goes to 1 is 1 4B 2 . Hence,
It is straightforward from Equation 7 that A max is not a function of k.
Since actions and payoffs are continuous in k, the above shows that, for any B, if k is sufficiently close to 1, A N T (1) > A max /2 as long as
Both sides of this inequality are continuous in B. Hence, to establish that
it now suffices to show that the limit as B goes to 1 of the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side. As B goes to 1, the left-hand side of this inequality goes to 3 4 , while the right-hand side goes to 1 2 , establishing the result.
To recapitulate, in this section we have shown that there are "significant sets" of parameter values in which eliminating transparency and leaving the budget fungible is preferred by the Overseer to leaving actions transparent and setting task-specific budgets. The cost of eliminating transparency is weakened incentives (Proposition 5.4). The benefit of eliminating transparency is ex post efficiency (Proposition 5.2). As the Overseer becomes increasingly uncertain about the policy success technology, these benefits loom larger relative to the costs. And, indeed, if uncertainty is both large and consequential enough, the Overseer prefers to do away with transparency and optimal budget caps (Proposition 5.6).
Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss two points. The first concerns the game form assumed in the analysis of the case with uncertainty about the policy success technology. The second is about the relationship of our results to canonical results about multitask in political and non-political environments.
Information Rents and Transparency
As the above analysis makes clear, uncertainty over the technology by which policy translates into outcomes is a key component of our argument against transparency when the Overseer has ex ante control over the task-specific budget caps. If the technology is known to the Overseer, she can choose budget caps that implement the efficient allocation of A max across the two tasks. When the Overseer is uncertain of the policy success technology, the best she can do is accept either some ex post inefficiency or a reduction in overall expenditures. All of this points to the fact that the Overseer values additional information about the policy success technology. As such, if such information is available to an outside expert, the Overseer may be willing to pay for it, thereby avoiding the need to do away with transparency.
Further, even in an environment in which the Overseer remains sufficiently uninformed about the policy success technology so that her ex ante preference is to eliminate transparency, she wants to maximize the Policymaker's expenditures on the second task at any possible history. Hence, after the first allocation is taken, the Overseer has a preference for undoing her commitment to non-transparency. As such, she would be willing to pay an outside auditor to report on the Policymaker's second-stage expenditures, so that she could condition her retention rule on those expenditures. Of course, if the Policymaker anticipates that the Overseer will do so, then the effect of eliminating transparency is undermined.
It is certainly possible that the Overseer in an extended model might seek to learn the policy success technology from experts or discover task-specific expenditures from auditors.
However, the Policymaker clearly has an incentive to thwart the Overseer's attempts to learn such information. In particular, in the spirit of Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) , the Policymaker might attempt to bribe any expert or auditor in order to restore incentives for the Overseer to adopt a non-transparent institutional design. The Policymaker is willing to do so because he makes informational rents in the absence of transparency. These rents come from the fact that, under transparency, the Overseer can extract expenditure from the Policymaker all the way up to the Policymaker being indifferent between retention and the expenditure and non-retention and expending nothing. When the Overseer cannot observe actions directly, she only rewards success. This allows the Policymaker to optimally trade-off retention incentives against rents from resources not expended on policy. Since the Policymaker always has the option of expending nothing on policy and foregoing retention, her payoff under the optimal level of spending must leave her better off than she would be with transparency.
To see this more formally, note that the Policymaker's expected payoff without transparency is
while the Policymaker's expected payoff with transparency is
Comparing, we have
where the inequality follows from the fact that A N T is optimal and interior, and the penultimate equality follows from the definition of A max .
In sum, while there may be circumstances in which the Overseer would be willing to expend resources at the ex ante stage to learn more details of the policy success technology and at the interim stage to undo her commitment to eliminating transparency, one may expect such efforts to run up against those of the Policymaker, who is similarly willing to expend resources to maintain incentives for non-transparency.
Multitask and Weak Incentives
Multitask problems in political agency have been studied in a variety of papers (Lohmann, 1998; Besley and Coate, 2003; Ashworth, 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006; Gehlbach, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson, 2007; Hatfield and Padró i Miquel, 2007; Daley and Snowberg, 2011; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014; Le Bihan, 2014) . Importantly, none of these models consider the issue of sequential actions prior to a retention decision, which is our focus. Moreover, most existing work on institutional responses to agency problems due to multi-task in political accountability relationships focuses on separation of powers (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997; Gailmard and Patty, 2009) or other forms of unbundling (Calabresi and Rhodes, 1992; Besley and Coate, 2003; Marshall, 2006; Berry and Gersen, 2008; Gersen, 2010; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014) . Here we consider institutional responses-including budgeting and eliminating transparency-which might be optimal in settings where responsibility for the tasks is not separately assigned.
At first glance, our results on eliminating transparency may seem similar to the well known fact that, in the standard model of multitask, the Overseer wants to reduce the power of incentives in order to avoid distorting effort towards a more observable task (Holmström and Milgrom, 1991) . In particular, in our model, when the Overseer eliminates transparency in order to avoid the distortions associated with ex ante optimal budget caps, she weakens incentives. But there is a critical difference between the two results. In our model, eliminating transparency does not reduce distortions by weakening incentives. Instead, eliminating transparency reduces distortions by forcing the Overseer to only condition retention on outcomes, which (conditional on a level of expenditures) gives the Policymaker incentives to allocate resources efficiently. Another way to see this is the following. In Holmström and Milgrom (1991) , the best possible arrangement for the principal is one with full transparency-i.e., one in which all tasks are observable. In our model, as shown in Propositions 5.5 and 5.6, sometimes the optimal arrangement for the Overseer is for neither task to be observable.
Conclusion
We identify a novel political time inconsistency problem, resulting from a overseer's incentive to revise her retention rule in environments with sequential actions by a policymaker. The political agency relationships that are our primary motivation here often take place in such environments, and the inter-temporal consequences of time inconsistency that we analyze help account for the behavioral properties attributed to such relationships by empirical scholars. In particular, our model predicts that Policymakers will over-emphasize tasks late in the policy-making process. Indeed, even under the optimal task-specific budgets, the Policymaker expends a larger percentage of the budget allocated to the second task than she expends of the budget allocated to the first task.
Apart from characterizing the nature of the overseer's time inconsistency problem, we also provide a normative analysis of institutional responses to the distortions caused by the time inconsistency problem. In particular, we focus on two key tools that may be available to political overseers: budgetary control and the overseer's informational environment. Our key result is that when uncertainty over the technology by which policy translates into outcomes is sufficiently minimal, overseers can use task-specific budget caps to ensure ex ante efficient allocations of resources across tasks, including the optimal allocation under full information; when uncertainty is sufficiently large and consequential, the overseer will be better off doing away with transparency and removing budgetary caps that constrain the policymaker's allocation of expenditures across tasks. This institutional choice results in lower total expenditures on policy, but an ex post efficient allocation of expenditures across the two tasks.
At the root of this new argument about the potential liabilities of transparency is the conjunction of uncertainty and the time inconsistency problem we describe. If a overseer could commit ex ante to not revising her retention rule for the policymaker after the first allocation, transparency would enhance, rather than limit, policymaker performance, allowing the overseer to maintain a fungible budgetary environment and extract the ex post efficient allocations in equilibrium. The overseer's temptation to revise the retention rule that underlies her time inconsistency problem means that, given transparency with respect to policymaker actions, the overseer will prefer to impose a cap on the policymaker's second allocation. The ex post inefficiencies associated with doing so, given uncertainty over the policy success technology, eventually lead the overseer to prefer an institutional environment with a fungible budget and non-transparency-tying her hands with respect to revision for the sake of harnessing the policymaker's expertise.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1. Suppose the Overseer commits to the rule "retain if and only if the Policymaker chooses (a † 1 (A max ), a † 2 (A max ))." The argument in the text shows that choosing (a † 1 (A max ), a † 2 (A max )) is a best response. To see that the Overseer cannot choose a rule that would do any better, consider some arbitrary rule, r ∈ R. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that it achieves a total level of expenditure A > A max . The Policymaker's payoff from A is bounded above by:
Since A > A max , we know
Since the policymaker can always guarantee herself a payoff of u(A) by allocating no resources, A was not a best response to r.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
Necessity: Fix an s * that is robust to small revision costs.
Consider the retention stage. Fix an . At this stage, the Policymaker's actions are already taken. The Overseer's action at this stage has no effect on the choice of Policymaker actions. However, if ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 , the Overseer suffers a cost . Hence, sequential rationality requires ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ). Since this is true for all and the sequence converges, this establishes point 1.
Next consider the Policymaker's strategy in the second policy-making stage. For any , the Policymaker infers that the Overseer will choose ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 . Hence, the Policymaker chooses a 2 to maximize his expected utility given the retention rule m 2 and the history. That is, for any , a 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for any (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). This establishes point 2.
Next consider the Overseer's strategy in the second policy-making stage. Definem 2 (a 1 ) = arg max m 2 ∈R p(a 1 , a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 )). For any > 0, given that the action a 1 is already taken, the Overseer chooses m 2 to maximize her utility net of any revision costs. Thus, she either chooses m 2 = m 1 or she chooses m 2 =m 2 (a 1 ). For each history (m 1 , a 1 ) with m 1 =m 2 (a 1 ), she chooses m 2 =m 2 (a 1 ) for sufficiently small, in particular, she does so if a 2 (m 1 , m 1 , a 1 ) ≥ . Label with (m 1 , a 1 ), the that makes this hold with equality. Recall, from the previous paragraph, that a 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). Hence,m 2 (a 1 ) = m * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). Thus, it suffices to show that, given that it converges (which we know by hypothesis), the sequence {m 2 } converges tom 2 (a 1 ). This is clearly true, since m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) =m 2 (a 1 ) for all < (m 1 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , a 1 ). This establishes point 3.
Next consider the Policymaker's strategy in the first policy-making stage. Fix an > 0.
Define m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) as whichever of m 1 andm 2 (a 1 ) maximizes the Overseer's expected utility at the second policy-making stage. By backward induction, the Policymaker knows that for any (m 1 , a 1 ), the Overseer will choose m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) and the Policymaker himself will then best respond with a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ), a 1 ). Hence, the Policymaker chooses
. We need to show that, given that it converges, the sequence {a 1 (m 1 )} converges to a * 1 (m 1 ). Given an , for any (m 1 , a 1 ), the Overseer chooses m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) either equal to m 1 or to m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 ). Suppose the Policymaker anticipates that for his choice of a 1 (m 1 ), we have m 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )) = m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )). Then a 1 (m 1 ) must be a best response to m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )), which implies a 1 (m 1 ) = a * 1 (m 1 ). Now suppose the Policymaker anticipates that for his choice of a 1 (m 1 ), we have m 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )) = m 1 = m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )). By the fact that m 2 = m * 2 , there exists a second-stage retention rule that would yield a higher second-stage action. So for low enough (in particular, < (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 ))) we have that m 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )) = m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )). Now, since a 1 (m 1 ) = a 1 (m 1 ) = a * 1 (m 1 ), this takes us back to the first case and establishes point 4. a 1 (m 1 ) ). This makes the Overseer strictly better off. To see this, note that as already argued, a 1 is left unchanged. But the Overseer avoids revising the rule and bearing cost . Thus, for sufficiently small, sequential rationality implies that m 1 ∈ arg max r∈R p(a 1 (r), a 2 (r, m * 2 (a 1 (r), r), a 1 (r))). Now note that a 1 = a * 1 and a 2 = a * 2 . This establishes point 5. Sufficiency: Fix an s * satisfying 1-5.
From the necessity proof, the Policymaker's strategy in s * is identical to his strategy in a SPNE of a game with any . Thus, all we need to show is convergence of the Overseer's strategy.
First, consider whether m 2 converges to m * 2 . Fix a δ > 0. We must show that there exists an such that |m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) − m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 )| < δ, for all (m 1 , a 1 ). By point 3, m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) = m 2 (a 1 ) for all (m 1 , a 1 ). Thus, it suffices to show there exists an such that |m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) − m 2 (a 1 )| < δ. This is true for all < (m 1 , a 1 ) , since for such , m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) =m 2 (a 1 ).
Finally, consider whether m 1 converges to m * 1 . Fix a δ > 0. By sequential rationality, for any , m 1 ∈ arg max r∈R p(a * 1 (r), a * 2 (r, m 2 (a * 1 (r), r), a * 1 (r))). And, as we saw above, for sufficiently small, m 2 = m * 2 . Hence, for those same , m 1 = m * 1 .
Proof of Lemma 2.2. From Lemma 2.1, the second allocation can be a 2 following the
for all a 2 ∈ [0, a 2 ]. It is easiest to induce the Policymaker to choose a 2 by setting the retention probability to 0 for all other choices. Suppose m 2 assigns probability r to retention following a 2 and 0 for all other choices. Then a 2 is a best response if and only if rB + u(A −
Clearly, now, the binding constraint for the Policymaker is a 2 = 0. Hence, a 2 is a best response if and only if rB + u(A − a 1 − a 2 ) ≥ u(A − a 1 ). Setting r = 1 now establishes the result.
Proof of Lemma 2.4. By Lemma 2.3, if a 1 ≥â 1 , then the Policymaker will be induced, in the second policy-making stage, to chooseâ 2 (a 1 ) and will be retained for certain. Hence, for any a 1 ≥â 1 , the Policymaker's payoff is B + u(A − a 1 −â 2 (a 1 )). Equation 2 implies that the Policymaker's payoff can be written as u(A − a 1 ). This is strictly decreasing in a 1 . Hence, the payoff from choosing a 1 ≥â 1 , when the Overseer uses a retention rule that is consistent with a SPNE that is robust to small revisions costs, is bounded above by u(A −â 1 ). But the Policymaker can deviate to (0, 0) and make a payoff that is bounded below by u(A) > u(A −â 1 ). Thus, a 1 ≥â 1 is never part of a best response.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. (i ) From Lemma 2.3, following a 1 <â 1 , any retention rule that is consistent with a SPNE that is robust to small revision costs must induce a 2 = a 2 . To find a lower bound on the associated payoff, consider the lowest retention probability that the Overseer can offer while still inducing A. Clearly, the Overseer should offer certain non-retention for any a 2 < a 2 . Let q(a 1 , a 2 ) be the retention probability at (a 1 , a 2 ). The
Policymaker's best response will be to choose a 2 = a 2 , as long as this retention probability satisfies q(a 1 , a 2 )B + u(A − a 1 − a 2 ) ≥ u(A − a 1 ). Call the smallest retention probability that satisfies this conditionq(a 1 , a 2 ). It satisfieŝ
Thus, the lower bound on payoffs from the pair (a 1 , a 2 ) is u(A − a 1 ), as required.
The highest payoff possible from a pair (a 1 , a 2 ) is the one associated with certain retention. This yields a payoff of B + u(A − a 1 − a 2 ), which establishes the upper bound.
(ii ) The argument above shows that a rule that assigns retention probabilityq(a 1 , a 2 )
to the pair (a 1 , a 2 ) and retention probability 0 to any pair (a 1 , a 2 ) with a 2 = a 2 does so.
(iii ) Consider the rule that assigns retention probability 1 to the pair (a 1 , a 2 ) and retention probability 0 to any pair (a 1 , a 2 ) with a 2 = a 2 . Since 1 >q(a 1 , a 2 ), this rule induces a 2 = a 2 following a 1 . Moreover, the argument from point 1 establishes that it induces the payoff required.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose B ≤ u(A) − u(A − a 2 ). Here,â 1 < 0. Hence, for any a 1 , by Lemma 2.4, the Overseer will announce a rule that induces a 2 =â 2 (a 1 ). All that remains is to see that a 1 must equal 0. To see this, note from the definition ofâ 2 (a 1 ) that, in this case,â 2 (a 1 ) < a 2 . Hence, in order to induceâ 2 (a 1 ), the Overseer must reward the choice ofâ 2 (a 1 ) with certain retention. Given this, clearly the Policymaker's best response in the first policy-making stage is to choose a 1 = 0. Notice, when B = u(A) − u(a 2 ),
Suppose B ∈ u(A) − u(a 2 ), u(A) − u(0) . In this case,â 1 > 0. Lemmas 2.3 and 2.5 thus show that the Overseer will announce and use a retention rule that induces a 2 = a 2 .
Lemma 2.6 shows that the Overseer will announce and use a retention rule that induces a 1 =ã.
Lemma 8.1 Consider the model with a fungible budget. An associated SPNE, s * , is robust to small revision costs if and only if
Proof. Necessity: Fix an s * that is robust to small revision costs.
Consider the retention stage. Fix an . At this stage, the policymaker's actions are already taken. The overseer's action at this stage has no effect on the choice of policymaker actions. However, if ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 , the overseer suffers a cost . Hence, sequential rationality requires ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ). Since this is true for all and the sequence converges, this establishes point 1.
Next consider the policymaker's strategy in the second policy-making stage. For any , the policymaker infers that the overseer will choose ρ (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 , a 2 ) = m 2 . Hence, the policymaker chooses a 2 to maximize his expected utility given the retention rule m 2 and the history. That is, for any , a 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for any (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). This establishes point 2.
Next consider the overseer's strategy in the second policy-making stage. Definem 2 (a 1 ) = arg max
For any > 0, given that the action a 1 is already taken, the overseer chooses m 2 to maximize her utility net of any revision costs. Thus, she either chooses m 2 = m 1 or she chooses m 2 =m 2 (a 1 ). For each history (m 1 , a 1 ) with m 1 = m 2 (a 1 ), she chooses m 2 =m 2 (a 1 ) for sufficiently small, in particular, she does so if max m 2 ∈R p(a 1 , a 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 )) − p(a 1 , a 2 (m 1 , m 1 , a 1 ) ≥ . Label with (m 1 , a 1 ), the that makes this hold with equality. Recall, from the previous paragraph, that a 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) = a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). Hence,m 2 (a 1 ) = m * 2 (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , m 2 , a 1 ). Thus, it suffices to show that, given that it converges (which we know by hypothesis), the sequence {m 2 } converges tom 2 (a 1 ). This is clearly true, since m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) =m 2 (a 1 ) for all < (m 1 , a 1 ) for all (m 1 , a 1 ). This establishes point 3.
Next consider the policymaker's strategy in the first policy-making stage. Fix an > 0.
Define m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) as whichever of m 1 andm 2 (a 1 ) maximizes the overseer's expected utility at the second policy-making stage. By backward induction, the policymaker knows that for any (m 1 , a 1 ), the overseer will choose m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) and the policymaker himself will then best respond with a * 2 (m 1 , m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ), a 1 ). Hence, the policymaker chooses
. We need to show that, given that it converges, the sequence {a 1 (m 1 )} converges to a * 1 (m 1 ). Given an , for any (m 1 , a 1 ), the overseer chooses m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) either equal to m 1 or to m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 ). Suppose the policymaker anticipates that for his choice of a 1 (m 1 ), we have m 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )) = m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )). Then a 1 (m 1 ) must be a best response to m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )), which implies a 1 (m 1 ) = a * 1 (m 1 ). Now suppose the policymaker anticipates that for his choice of a 1 (m 1 ), we have m 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )) = m 1 = m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 )). By the fact that m 2 = m * 2 , there exists a second period retention rule that would yield a higher second period action. So for low enough (in particular, < (m 1 , a 1 (m 1 ))) we have that a 1 (m 1 )) . Now, since a 1 (m 1 ) = a 1 (m 1 ) = a * 1 (m 1 ), this takes us back to the first case and establishes point 4.
Finally, consider the overseer's strategy in the first policy-making stage. For any a 1 (m 1 )) . This makes the overseer strictly better off. To see this, note that as already argued, a 1 is left unchanged. But the overseer avoids revising the rule and bearing cost . Thus, for sufficiently small, sequential rationality implies that m 1 ∈ arg max r∈R p(a 1 (r), a 2 (r, m * 2 (a 1 (r), r), a 1 (r))). Now note that a 1 = a * 1 and a 2 = a * 2 . This establishes point 5. Sufficiency: Fix an s * satisfying 1-5.
From the necessity proof, the policymaker's strategy in s * is identical to his strategy in a SPNE of a game with any . Thus, all we need to show is convergence of the overseer's strategy.
First, consider whether m 2 converges to m * 2 . Fix a δ > 0. We must show that there exists an such that |m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) − m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 )| < δ, for all (m 1 , a 1 ). By point 3, m * 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) = m 2 (a 1 ) for all (m 1 , a 1 ). Thus, it suffices to show there exists an such that |m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) − m 2 (a 1 )| < δ. This is true for all < (m 1 , a 1 ), since for such , m 2 (m 1 , a 1 ) =m 2 (a 1 ).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For any history (m 1 , a 1 ) with a 1 <â 1 , the policymaker anticipates an equilibrium payoff of
Differentiating with respect to a 1 , the Policymaker will choose a 1 = 0 if:
Since −u < 0, the condition holds if 1 + dâ 2 (a 1 ) da 1 > 0. Thus, all that remains is to show that
Recall thatâ 2 (a 1 ) is implicitly defined by Equation 2. Differentiating the implicit function we have:
Since u is concave, this is clearly negative. However, it is greater than −1 since u (A − a 1 ) >
0.
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
There are two cases:
Here, total effort under ex ante commitment satisfies
Total effort under sequential policy making isâ 2 (0), which, from equation 2, is given by:
Again, total effort under ex ante commitment satisfies:
From Proposition 2.1, effort under sequential policy making isã 1 + a 2 . From equation 4,ã 1 satisfies:
This implies that total effort satisfies:
which establishes the equality.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The first claim follows from Propositions 2.1 and 1.1.
It is straightforward that this condition is satisfied at a * * 1 =
A max 2 and since there is a unique solution, this establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Suppose some pair (a 1 , a 2 ), with max{a 1 , a 2 } > 0, is a best response to r at ω. This implies the following:
for all (a 1 , a 2 ).
Define a 1 + a 2 ≡ A . To get a contradiction, suppose that (a 1 , a 2 ) = (a ω 1 (A ), a ω 2 (A )). Now notice that:P (0) <p(a 1 , a 2 , ω) <P (A ).
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists aÂ < A such that
Now we have the following;
so (a 1 , a 2 ) was not a best response to r at ω.
Proof of Proposition 5.3.
1. First consider the fungible budget. For any retention rule, at any ω, Proposition 5.2 shows that the Policymaker divides his total effort efficiently. As such, the Overseer simply wants to maximize the Policymaker's total effort. The Policymaker's total effort solves:
By Assumption 1, spending the whole budget is strictly dominated. And since p satisfies the Inada conditions, the Policymaker will choose a positive allocation. Hence, the Policymaker's effort is interior and given by the following first-order condition: dP dA (A * * , ω)(r(s) − r(f )) = u (A − A * * ).
It is straightforward that A * * is maximized at r(s) = 1 and r(f ) = 0, as required.
Next consider budget caps (a 1 , a 2 ). To get a contradiction, suppose that the optimal rule is some r that does not satisfy r(s) = 1 and r(f ) = 0. Further, suppose (a 1 , a 2 ) are the Policymaker's best response to r. There are now two cases to consider.
(a) Suppose a 1 < a 1 and a 2 < a 2 . Then they are characterized by the following first order conditions:p 1 (a 1 , a 2 , ω)[r(s) − r(f )] = u (A − a 1 − a 2 ) andp 2 (a 1 , a 2 , ω)[r(s) − r(f )] = u (A − a 1 − a 2 ).
It is straightforward that a 1 and a 2 are increasing in r(s) − r(f ), so r was not the optimal rule.
(b) Suppose one of a 1 or a 2 is equal to the corresponding budget cap. Without loss of generality, let it be a 1 = a 1 . Then a 2 is characterized by the following first order condition:p 2 (a 1 , a 2 , ω)[r(s) − r(f )] = u (A − a 1 − a 2 ).
Clearly a 1 is non-decreasing and a 2 is increasing in r(s) − r(f ), so r was not the optimal rule.
The two points above show that for any ω, the optimal rule is r(s) = 1 and r(f ) = 0.
Hence, this is the optimal rule, ex ante, for the Overseer.
2. Since, by Proposition 5.2, the allocation across tasks is efficient under a fungible budget, it suffices to show that total effort is weakly higher under a fungible budget than under budget caps.
Label the Policymaker's equilibrium total spending, given the retention rule (r(s) = 1, r(f ) = 0), under a fungible budget A F . Label the Policymaker's equilibrium total spending, given the retention rule (r(s) = 1, r(f ) = 0), under a particular budget cap A C (a 1 , A − a 2 ). Now, defineÂ 1 (ω, a 1 ) as the lowest amount of total spending such that, at ω, the efficient allocation involves a ω 1 (A) ≥ a 1 . That is, a ω 1 (Â 1 (ω, a 1 )) = a 1 .
Since a ω 1 (A) is strictly increasing in A, it is straightforward thatÂ 1 (ω, a 1 ) exists and is unique for each (ω, a 1 ). DefineÂ 2 (ω, a 2 ) analogously.
There are two cases to consider.
(a) Suppose that A C ≤ min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}. Then the efficient division of the Policymaker's total spending is unconstrained by the budget caps. As such, by an argument identical to the proof of Proposition 5.2, the Policymaker will choose this efficient division. Hence, the Policymaker faces an identical problem to the situation with a fungible budget and total spending is the same under each, as required.
(b) Suppose A C > min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}. Without loss of generality, let's assumeÂ 1 (ω, a 1 ) = min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}. The best responses under this budget cap, then, are (a 1 , A C − a 1 ). There are now two sub-cases to consider: i. A F < min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}. This implies that a ω 1 (A F ) < a 1 and a ω 2 (A F ) < a 2 . But this implies that the allocation chosen under the fungible budget was feasible under budget caps. Since it was optimal in the unconstrained problem, and it satisfies the constraints, it remains optimal in the constrained problem. This contradicts that (a 1 , A C − a 1 ) was a best response. Hence, it is not possible for A C > min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )} and A F < min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}.
ii. Now consider A F ≥ min{Â 1 (ω, a 1 ),Â 2 (ω, a 2 )}. This implies that a ω 1 (A F ) ≥ a 1 . Since second allocations are interior, they satisfy first order conditions.
In the case of a fungible budget we have:
In the case of the budget caps we have:
Since we already know that a ω 1 (A F ) ≥ a 1 , to show that A F ≥ A C it suffices to show that a F 2 ≥ a C 2 .
To get a contradiction, assume a F 2 < a C 2 . From the concavity ofp we have:
This fact, combined with the weak complementarity of a 1 and a 2 inp, implieŝ
This inequality, implies that the left-hand side of the first-order condition in Equations 9 is larger than the left-hand side of the first-order condition in 10, which implies a F 2 > a C 2 , a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5.4.
where the first equality is the definition of A max , the first inequality follows from the fact that for all (a 1 , a 2 , ω), p(a 1 , a 2 , ω) ∈ (0, 1), and the final inequality follows from the optimality of A N T under non-transparency. Thus, the Policymaker will allocate resources (a T 1 , A max − a T 1 ), satisfying:
The Overseer's expected payoff under transparency is thus, W T (µ 0 , ω) = µ 0 (ωf (a Since actions and payoffs are continuous in µ 0 , the above shows that, for any ω, if µ 0 is sufficiently close to 1/2, then non-transparency is preferred to transparency if
The left-hand side of this inequality is continuous in ω, while the right-hand side is constant in ω. Hence, to establish the result, it now suffices to consider the limit of the left-hand side as ω → 1.
Clearly, lim ω→1 a ω 1 (A) = A. Thus, we have:
Hence, for mu 0 sufficiently close to 1/2, there exists a τ (µ 0 ) < 1 such that for ω > τ (µ 0 ) non-transparency is preferred to transparency as long as
as required.
